Electability is the most pernicious of all lies to penetrate the Democratic psyche. Electability, as frequenter commenter JollyBuddah termed it, is "a fairy tale told by bloviating pundits." It is the sort of mendacity used by swindlers and tyrants: a few simple gimmicks can solve all your problems. Find the right person, from the right state, in the right region, with the right resume, and presto, that is all you need. Simple falsehoods of this sort can appeal to desperate people who, like Democrats, seek immediate relief to crushing problems. We want to believe that all it takes are a few simple tricks, especially when times are at their worst. We want to believe this because we need hope.
What has electability wrought? What do we have now that John Kerry has been defeated?
Do we have a network of volunteers who, now that the election is over, are available to work on projects other than the 2004 election? Not really, as our massive volunteer efforts were geared toward a single purpose that has now passed, and many were not even from the areas where they were volunteering.
Do we have down-ticket Congressional and gubernatorial success to celebrate apart from the Presidential race? No, as the current congressional makeup is very similar to 1994 and 1996.
Do we have stronger local organizations anywhere outside of Montana and Democratic areas of swing states? Not really, as we have no new grassroots structures from the campaign.
Do we have any new issues raised during the campaign that we can seize on as part of a developing national message that can be used to raise the level of debate and bring more people to our side in the future? Not really, unless you count Edwards and Obama. For the majority of the campaign, Kerry's message was his bio. We do not have a single ideological narrative with any national resonance.
No, no, no and no. Kerry's campaign, and subsequent defeat, left us with few improved outlooks on the future. We do have improved netroots, massively improved small donor fundraising, much better voter registration in important Democratic areas and our most favorable partisan index map in decades. There were some long-term victories, but not many. Further, what we did gain, long-term, was entirely as a side-effect of our all-out effort to win at any cost. We improved in swing states because we saw swing states as the key to defeating Bush in 2004. We improved in small donor fundraising because the campaign needed the money. We registered more voters in swing states purely in an attempt to win in 2004. If there was a long-term project we ignored, it was ignored because it was not seen as central toward victory in 2004.
In other words, because we are a party in the death-grip of electability, we consistently fail to work on engaging in the long-term structural organization needed in order to improve our fortunes, long-term. More after the jump.
